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LAWRENCE'S REPUBLIC

James E. Fleming*
I.

INTRODUCrION

I am delighted and honored to participate in this symposium critiquing and
celebrating the remarkable scholarship of Frank Michelman. I was a student of
Frank-but of course we all are students of Frank. I also have had the good
fortune to be a colleague of Frank-he has been a distinguished visiting professor
at Fordham and has generously participated in a number of our conferences there.
The only problem I had in preparing for the symposium is that Frank's scholarship
is so rich and wide-ranging that it was difficult to decide what to write about. I
initially planned to write a paper on Frank's famous arguments for constitutional
welfare rights.' Next, my paper was to be about Frank's reflections in his Storrs
Lectures at Yale Law School on "constitutional containment" and his musings in
recent work on the thinness of constitutional law as compared with our richer
commitments to justice. Then, I was tempted to write about "Michelman and
Democracy"-to assess his book, Brennan and Democracy,3 and his articles
developing a liberal republicanism. 4 I also thought of invoking a term Frank used
to describe Justice Brennan-"super liberal" 5-and
writing about "The
* I prepared this article for the Legal Scholarship Symposium on The Scholarship of Frank I.
Michelman, University of Tulsa College of Law, October 9-10, 2003. I want to thank Paul Finkelman
for inviting me to take part in the symposium and congratulate him and the College of Law on
establishing this wonderful series of symposia. I also want to thank the participants in the symposium
as well as Rick Carnell, Linda McClain, and Ben Zipursky for helpful comments, and Devon Filas for
helpful research assistance.
1. See e.g. Frank I. Michelman, Welfare Rights in a ConstitutionalDemocracy, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q.
659 [hereinafter Michelman, Welfare Rights]; Frank I. Michelman, In Pursuitof Constitutional Welfare
Rights: One View of Rawls' Theory of Justice, 121 U. Pa. L. Rev. 962 (1973); Frank I. Michelman,
Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth Amendment, 83 Harv. L. Rev. 7 (1969)
[hereinafter Michelman, Protectingthe Poor].
2. See e.g. Frank I. Michelman, Ida's Way: Constructingthe Respect-Worthy Governmental System,
72 Fordham. L. Rev. 345 (2003) [hereinafter Michelman, Ida's Way]; Frank I. Michelman, Populist
Natural Law (Reflections on Tushnet's "Thin Constitution"), 34 U. Rich. L. Rev. 461 (2000)
[hereinafter Michelman, Reflections]; Frank I. Michelman, ConstitutionalContainmentand Democracy
(unpublished Storrs Lectures, Yale L. Sch. Spring 2000) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review)
[hereinafter Michelman, Storrs Lectures].
3. Frank I. Michelman, Brennan and Democracy (Princeton U. Press 1999).
4. See id.; Frank I. Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 Yale L.J. 1493 (1988) [hereinafter Michelman,
Law's Republic]; Frank I. Michelman, Foreword: Traces of Self-Government, 100 Harv. L. Rev. 4
(1986) [hereinafter Michelman, Traces].
5. See Frank I. Michelman, Super Liberal: Romance, Community, and Tradition in William J.
Brennan, Jr.'s Constitutional Thought, 77 Va. L. Rev. 1261 (1991).
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Superliberalism of Frank Michelman." Or, focusing on the two intellectual giants
who have most influenced Frank's work, I thought of doing a paper called "Rawls
versus Habermas: The Struggle for the Soul of Frank Michelman., 6 But I finally
settled on "Lawrence's Republic."
Let me explain my title. One of Frank's greatest works is his article, "Law's
Republic.",7 It is a classic work in the so-called revival or reconstruction of civic
republicanism in constitutional theory-or, in the case of Frank, the synthesis of
liberalism and republicanism. But it is also a powerful, and profoundly wise,
critique of Bowers v. Hardwick,8 the infamous Supreme Court decision upholding
a statute outlawing sodomy as applied to homosexuals on the ground that the Due
Process Clause does not protect the right of homosexuals to privacy.9 Frank
constructively pointed out what was missing in the Court's opinion in Bowers, and
what the civic republican strain of discourse might offer in justifying a right of
privacy for homosexuals. 0
The first time Frank came to Fordham, I asked him, "If you could overrule
any one decision of the Supreme Court, what would it be?" Given Frank's fame
as a tireless and creative proponent of constitutional welfare rights, you might
think he would say San Antonio Independent School District v. Rodriguez," the
deplorable decision holding that the Equal Protection Clause does not protect a
right to an equal education and more generally shutting down the expansion of
both the fundamental rights strand and the suspect classifications strand of equal
protection analysis. 12 But no, Frank said Bowers v. Hardwick.
Well, as we all know, the Supreme Court itself overruled Bowers last
summer, in Lawrence v. Texas.13 Justice Kennedy's opinion of the Court in
Lawrence held that the Due Process Clause does protect the right of homosexuals
to privacy or autonomy; in doing so, it thoroughly criticized Bowers. I am going to
assess the Court's opinion in Lawrence in light of Frank's critique of Bowers in
"Law's Republic." Hence my title: "Lawrence's Republic." I won't exactly
ponder what I think Frank thinks or should think about Lawrence. He can tell us
that himself. But I will consider to what extent Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence
reflects or can be interpreted to map onto arguments and concerns of the sort
Frank put forward in "Law's Republic." I want to make clear, though, that I have
no illusions that the Court is on the verge of a more general adoption of a liberal
republicanism.

6. The examples of Michelman's engagement with Rawls's thought are legion. For examples of
Michelman's engagement with Habermas's thought, see Frank I. Michelman, Modus Vivendi
Postmodernus? On Just Interpretations and the Thinning of Justice, 21 Cardozo L. Rev. 1945 (2000);
Frank I. Michelman, Morality, Identity and "Constitutional Patriotism," 76 Denv. U. L. Rev. 1009
(1999); Frank I. Michelman, Family Quarrel,17 Cardozo L. Rev. 1163 (1996).
7. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4.
8. 478 U.S. 186 (1986), overruled,Lawrence v. Tex., 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
9. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1494-99 (critiquing Bowers, 478 U.S. 186).
10. Id. at 1532-37.
11. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
12. Id. at 54-59.
13. 123 S. Ct. 2472 (2003).
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I assume that some readers had the same initial response as I did upon
reading Lawrence for the first time. I was not simply relieved, excited, and
hopeful for the future. I just could not imagine a better opinion coming from the
Rehnquist Court than the one Kennedy issued. Note, I did not say I could not
imagine a better opinion, period. I said I could not imagine a better opinion
coming from the Rehnquist Court, given its incumbents and characteristic themes.
I grant, though, that some readers have argued that an equal protection holding
would have been superior to a due process holding.14 And some have expressed
fear of backlash akin to the backlash against Roe v. Wade. 5 In any event, after the
initial sighs of relief and celebrations, it is worth assessing Lawrence in the crucible
of Frank's analysis in "Law's Republic."
II.

MICHELMAN'S CRITIQUE OF BOWERS IN "LAW'S REPUBLIC"

What was Frank's critique of Bowers in "Law's Republic"? I am going to
put the criticisms more bluntly and reductively than Frank did. But I believe I will
be faithful to the general lines of his critique.
Most importantly, Frank criticized the authoritarianism of Bowers. To
appreciate the significance of this criticism, we need to recall that Justice White, in
Bowers, and champions of Bowers like Bork16 and Scalia17 present it as a
restoration of democracy over authoritarianism.
They celebrate it as a
repudiation of the authoritarianism of the judicial tyranny running from Lochner
v. New York18 through Griswold v. Connecticut 9 and Roe. Here I'll briefly sketch
Bork's and Scalia's view. On their view, Bowers fends off liberal perversion of the
Constitution in the name of fabricated fundamental rights to liberty and privacy.
It permits democratic majorities to rule for no reason other than that they are
majorities. Majorities properly are permitted to enact their moral disapproval of
folks at the margins like homosexuals for no better reason than that "they are
majorities"2 ° and have the votes to do so. Such persons are rightly, as Bork says,
"at the mercy of legislative majorities."'" What is more, Bowers cabins generative
(or to use Frank's term, "jurisgenerative" 22 ) principles of liberty and equality-

14. See e.g. Cass R. Sunstein, What Did Lawrence Hold? Of Autonomy, Desuetude, Sexuality, and
Marriage (John M. Olin L. & Econ. Working Paper No. 196 (2d Ser.) Sept. 2003) (available at <http://
www.law.uchicago.edu/Lawecon/index.html>).
15. 410 U.S. 113 (1973). See e.g. Jeffrey Rosen, Kennedy Curse: On Sodomy, the Court Overreaches,
New Republic 15 (July 21, 2003) (available at <http://www.tnr.com/doc.mhtml?i=20030721&s=
rosen072103>) (asserting that "in terms of its unnecessary breadth, Lawrence is worse than Roe").
16. See Robert H. Bork, The Tempting of America: The PoliticalSeduction of the Law 116-26 (Free
Press 1990).
17. See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2488-98 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting); Romer
v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 636-53 (1996) (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
18. 198 U.S. 45 (1905).
19. 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
20. Bork, supra n. 16, at 139.
21. Id. at 49 (quoting Lochner, 198 U.S. at 59). "Being 'at the mercy of legislative majorities' is
merely another way of describing the basic American plan: representative democracy." Id.
22. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1502, 1513-14. Michelman conceives constitutional
interpretation as "jurisgenerative," a form of "self-revisionary normative dialogue." Id. at 1493. He
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principles that might constrain democratic majorities-through conceiving "this
Nation's history and tradition
as nothing more than a deposit of our concrete
historical practices.2 ' According to Bork and Scalia, all this is as it should be.
But according to Frank, all this is what is wrong with Bowers. What is wrong
with Bowers coheres around its authoritarianism and how that ultimately figures
in its very conception of democracy. What is wrong with Bowers is its view of the
Constitution and law as the deposit of external authority and its hidebound refusal
to engage in what Frank calls jurisgenerative constitutional interpretation.25 I
want to break out three interrelated aspects of Bowers's authoritarianism.
First, the authoritarianism of Bowers's originalism in general. Bowers's
originalism presupposes that if the founders did not specifically enumerate a right,
it is not a constitutional right.2 6 It also presupposes that fidelity to the
Constitution requires following the rules laid down by, or giving effect to the
relatively concrete original understandings of, the framers and ratifiers. Bowers's
originalism suffers from several dispositive flaws, one of which I will emphasize
here. The authoritarianism of its originalism is a massive insult to the dignity of
both the founders and us; it attributes arrogance to the authors of the norms of the
Constitution (the founders) and subservience to the subjects of those norms (us).
To add further insult, its proponents (including White, Bork, and Scalia) serve this
27
authoritarianism up to us in the name of democracy!
Second, the authoritarianism of Bowers's conception of "this Nation's
history and tradition" in particular. To capture this aspect, there is no better place
to begin than with Justice Blackmun's argument in dissent:
Like Justice Holmes, I believe that "[ilt is revolting to have no better reason for a
rule of law than that so it was laid down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more
revolting if the grounds upon which it was laid down have
vanished long since, and
28
the rule simply persists from blind imitation of the past."

writes: "Jurisgenerative political debate among a plurality of self-governing subjects involves the
contested 're-collection'... of a fund of public normative references conceived as narratives, analogies,
and other professions of commitment. Upon that fund those subjects draw both for identity and, by
the same token, for moral and political freedom." Id. at 1513 (footnote omitted). He adds that
the idea of such a fund, together with that of the persuasive process of its contested
recollection, seems all but indistinguishable from... Ronald Dworkin's linked notions of
law "as integrity," of law as the medium of the community's constitutive commitment to
"consistency in principle" in its treatments of its members, and of law as the
"personification" of the community itself ....
Id. at 1514 (citing Ronald Dworkin, Law's Empire (Harv. U. Press 1986)).
23. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192 (quoting Moore v. City of E. Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494, 503 (1977))
(internal quotations omitted).
24. See James E. Fleming, Constructing the Substantive Constitution, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 211, 270-71
(1993) (criticizing Bowers, 478 U.S. at 192-94).
25. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1494-99, 1532-37.
26. See 478 U.S. at 191-95.
27. See James E. Fleming, Lecture, Are We All OriginalistsNow? I Hope Not! (Princeton U., Sept.
19, 2002) (copy on file with Tulsa Law Review).
28. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 199 (Blackmun, Brennan, Marshall & Stevens, JJ., dissenting) (quoting
O.W. Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 Harv. L. Rev. 457, 469 (1897)).
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Frank's primary objection here is to Bowers's ossification of law, history, and
tradition: its resolutely anti-jurisgenerative cast. On Bowers's view, the meaning
of the Constitution-including that of "this Nation's history and tradition"-is
given to us as an historical fact of the matter and determined by external
authority: not only that of the founders through their understandings or
expectations but also that of the legislatures who wrote the statutes and the judges
who developed the common law that make up the background historical deposit at
particular points in history (e.g., the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in
1868).
To invoke a distinction that I have drawn elsewhere between two
conceptions of tradition, Bowers views tradition not as abstract aspirational
principles to be elaborated and realized over time, but as concrete historical
practicesto be discovered and preserved.2 9 Abstract aspirational principles are the
principles to which we as a people aspire and for which we as a people stand,
whether or not we have realized them in our concrete historical practices, statute
books, and common law. On Bowers's view, fidelity to the Constitution entails
following our concrete historical practices rather than honoring our abstract
aspirational principles (by elaborating them so as to make them the best that they
can be).
Third and finally, the authoritarianism of Bowers's majoritarianism: that is,
the authoritarianism of its very conception of democracy. Bowers's conception of
democracy itself is authoritarian. For again, it assumes that majorities may enact
their moral disapproval of minorities (e.g., "the presumed belief of a majority
in... Georgia that homosexual sodomy is immoral"'3 ) for no better reason than
that they are majorities. As Bork puts it, minorities are "at the mercy" of
majorities, and that is our system.31 Cass Sunstein has aptly characterized this
feature of Bork's authoritarianism as a form of "might makes right. 3 2 This entails
that Bowers's conception of democracy is authoritarian in a "moral majoritarian"
sense. Frank's analysis brings out that Bowers's conception of democracy is also
authoritarian in a classical republican sense: it exalts the morality (or supposed
moral and civic virtue) of the citizens in the center to the exclusion of the outliers
or barbarians at the margins, in this case, homosexuals.33 Hence, in Bowers, what
Frank calls the obnoxious, solidaristic side of republicanism prevails over the
34
Bowers
jurisgenerative side of republicanism that he seeks to reconstruct.
35
resolutely refuses to bring homosexuals, as Frank puts it, "from [the] margins to
the "center ' 36 as enjoying the status of free and equal citizenship. White refuses to

29. See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1, 56-59 (1995);
Fleming, supra n. 24, at 268-73.
30. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 196.
31. Bork, supra n. 16, at 49.
32. Cass R. Sunstein, The PartialConstitution 107-10 (Harv. U. Press 1993).
33. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1495-96.
34. See id. at 1493, 1496.
35. See id. at 1529.
36. See id.
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accord homosexuals a right of privacy as an aspect of citizenship. He denies that
homosexual intimate association "bears any resemblance, 37 to that of
heterosexuals.38 And he rudely asserts that it would be "facetious" to hold that
principles of liberty and privacy extend to protect homosexual intimate
association.3 9
How would Frank justify the opposite result in Bowers? First, through a
jurisgenerative-rather
than
authoritarian-approach
to
constitutional
interpretation.
Second, through a jurisgenerative-rather than narrowly
positivistic, historicist, and traditionalist-conception of law, history, and
tradition. Finally, through a liberal republican-rather than authoritarianconception of democracy and self-government. Frank constructs a process-based
liberal republican theory that would secure the right of privacy for homosexuals as
an aspect of their citizenship in law's republic. n0 I want to point out that, unlike
some other modern civic republicans, 41 Frank labors under no theoretical
compulsion to eschew privacy for equal protection, or to recast privacy rights as
equal protection rights. For Frank, developing a process-based liberal republican
theory does not mean neglecting or forsaking privacy in favor of equality.
To what extent does Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence, both in its critique of
Bowers and its justification of its holding, resemble or parallel Frank's analysis? Is
it jurisgenerative rather than authoritarian? Is it republican as well as liberal? I
shall proceed in three stages. One, I will consider to what degree Kennedy's
opinion, like Frank's critique, repudiates the authoritarianism of Bowers in favor
of a jurisgenerative approach to constitutional interpretation. Two, I will
differentiate the "liberal" from the "republican" strains of Kennedy's opinion
justifying the right of homosexuals to privacy or autonomy and see how well they
accord with Frank's liberal republican conception of privacy. And three, I will
ponder whether there is anything significant missing from Kennedy's opinion that
Frank's analysis would give us.
III.

KENNEDY'S OPINION IN LAWRENCE IN LIGHT OF
MICHELMAN'S CRITIQUE OF BOWERS

Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence, like Frank's critique of Bowers, strikingly
repudiates the authoritarianism of Bowers in favor of a more jurisgenerative
approach. I shall sketch three respects in which it does so. First, Kennedy's is
decidedly not an originalist opinion. In other work, I have distinguished between
the old, narrow originalism and the new, broad originalism. 42 Many critics of

37. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 190.
38. Id. at 190-91.
39. Id. at 194.
40. Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1526, 1532-37.
41. See Fleming, supra n. 24, at 273-78 (criticizing Sunstein's form of liberal republicanism for
taking a flight from privacy to equal protection, or recasting privacy rights as equal protection rights, or
leaving them out altogether).
42. See James E. Fleming, Fidelity to Our Imperfect Constitution, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1335, 1336-37
(1997); Fleming, supra n. 27.
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Bowers-not Frank-have been styled as new, broad originalists. 43 What is new
or broad about their originalism is that they conceive the original understanding to
which they claim fidelity is owed at a considerably higher level of abstraction than
do the old, narrow originalists. Bowers is an old, narrow originalist opinion.
Might Lawrence be seen as a new, broad originalist opinion? Thus, might the
story of Bowers and Lawrence be a tale of two originalisms? In a word, no.
Bowers indeed is a tale of the old, narrow originalism. Recall especially
White's worry about the specter of Lochner, on the understanding that what was
wrong with Lochner was that it protected "unenumerated" fundamental rights
through the Due Process Clauses.44 And bear in mind that White's conception of
"this Nation's history and tradition" is a precursor to Scalia's conception of the
due process inquiry in Michael H. v. Gerald D.,45 which conceives tradition
as
46
principles.
aspirational
abstract
to
opposed
as
practices
historical
concrete
But Lawrence emphatically and strikingly is not a tale of the new, broad
originalism. What would a new, broad originalist justification of Lawrence look
like? It would say something like:
The founders knew the value of privacy of the home. They knew the value of
privacy or autonomy in making certain fundamental decisions about one's destiny.
Whether or not they specifically contemplated that privacy or autonomy protected
homosexual intimate sexual conduct and relationships, the value they enshrinedtranslated from their world to our world-extends to protect such conduct and
relationships.
Perhaps it would close with an exhortation: "For the founders, given the choice
between liberty and enforced conformity, chose liberty."
Such a move is utterly absent from Kennedy's opinion. Kennedy does not
invoke the authority of the founders, even abstractly. He elaborates principles of
liberty, privacy, and autonomy without feeling compelled to run his elaborations
through an account of the founders' abstract intentions, understandings, or
meanings. The founders appear on stage, or rear their heads, only in the very last
paragraph of the opinion. I quote that paragraph in its entirety:
Had those who drew and ratified the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth
Amendment or the Fourteenth Amendment known the components of liberty in its
manifold possibilities, they might have been more specific. They did not presume to

43. Examples of critiques of Bowers by constitutional theorists who are sometimes styled "broad
originalists" include: Akhil Reed Amar, Attainder and Amendment 2: Romer's Rightness, 95 Mich. L.
Rev. 203 (1996); Bruce Ackerman, Liberating Abstraction, 59 U. Chi. L. Rev. 317, 342-48 (1992); and
Michael J. Perry, The Constitution in the Courts: Law or Politics? 174-79 (Oxford U. Press 1994).
44. See Bowers, 478 U.S. at 194-95.
45. 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (plurality). It is well to note, however, that White dissented in Michael H.
itself. Id. at 157 (White & Brennan, JJ., dissenting). For a sympathetic interpretation of White's
privacy jurisprudence, which is nonetheless critical of his opinion in Bowers, see David D. Meyer,
Justice White and the Right of Privacy: A Model of Realism and Restraint, 52 Cath. U. L. Rev. 915
(2003).
46. See Fleming, supra n. 24, at 270-72 (analyzing White's opinion in Bowers as a precursor to
Scalia's conception of the appropriate methodology for interpreting the Due Process Clauses set forth
in Michael H., 491 U.S. at 127 n. 6 (endorsed only by Justice Scalia and Chief Justice Rehnquist)).
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have this insight. They knew times can blind us to certain truths and later
generations can see that laws once thought necessary and proper in fact serve only
to oppress. As the Constitution endures, persons in every generation can invoke its
principles in their own search for greater freedom.47

Thus, Kennedy, unlike the narrow originalists, does not attribute arrogance
and authoritarianism to the founders: "They did not presume" to enumerate
specifically the components of constitutionally protected liberty. This passage
underscores that the Court conceives the Constitution as an abstract scheme of
principles to be elaborated over time-in a "search for greater freedom"-not as
a specific code of detailed rules and enumerated rights, or as a deposit of the
founders' intentions, understandings, or meanings to be discovered and preserved.
If Kennedy does not claim to ground the right of privacy or autonomy in
original understanding, conceived abstractly, in what does he ground it? In the
line of privacy or autonomy cases beginning with Griswold and running through
48
Eisenstadt v. Baird,
Carey v. Population Services International,49 Roe, and
Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey ° (along with Romer v.
Evans,5' which is grounded in equal protection), 52 and in an understanding of
tradition as evolving consensus, not just in "this Nation" but in a wider, western
civilization.53
Kennedy's opinion, in not claiming to embrace any form of originalism,
resembles its twin pillars, the joint opinions in Casey and Romer. These twin
pillars are decidedly not originalist, old or new, narrow or broad. Recall especially
the last paragraph of the joint opinion in Casey:
Our Constitution is a covenant running from the first generation of Americans
to us and then to future generations. It is a coherent succession. Each generation
must learn anew that the Constitution's written terms embody ideas and aspirations
that must survive more ages than one. We accept our responsibility not to retreat
from interpreting the full meaning of the covenant in light of all of our precedents.
We invoke it once again to define the freedom guaranteed by the Constitution's own
promise, the promise of liberty.54

And recall that Kennedy's opinion of the Court in Romer similarly does not
invoke the authority of the founders and original understanding. The closest it
comes is to proclaim: "It is not within our constitutional tradition to enact laws of
this sort."55 In sum, Lawrence can be seen as a combination of Casey and Romer,
and as not having an originalist bone in its body.

47.
48.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.

Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2484.
405 U.S. 438 (1972).
431 U.S. 678 (1977).
505 U.S. 833 (1992).
517 U.S. 620 (1996).
Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2476-77, 2481-82.
Id. at 2480-83.
505 U.S. at 901.
Romer, 517 U.S. at 633.
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Second, Kennedy's opinion does not conceive history and tradition in an
authoritarian way, but in a jurisgenerative way. In general, Kennedy conceives
tradition not as a positivist, historicist, or traditionalist deposit of "millennia of
moral teaching '56 (to quote Burger's concurring opinion in Bowers), but as an
evolving consensus about how best to realize liberty (and by implication equality).
This evolving consensus reaches beyond "this Nation's history and tradition" to
that of a wider, Western civilization. Furthermore, Kennedy carefully scrutinizes
history to determine what the statutes, common law, and historical practices
actually prohibited. 57
He concludes that they actually prohibited sodomy
generally, not same-sex sodomy as such or even nonprocreative sexual conduct.
In this respect, his opinion is markedly different from White's and Burger's
opinions in Bowers, and more like Stevens's dissenting opinion there.58 The Court
practically accepts the very unauthoritarian notion of "[t]he [i]nvention of
[h]eterosexuality,"5 9 and thus the invention of homosexuality, as against the idea
that it is just there as a natural and moral fact of the matter and that it has been
condemned through millennia of Judeo-Christian moral teaching.
In particular, what exactly is the role of history in Kennedy's opinion? The
Court does not use history affirmatively to support the right of homosexuals to
privacy or autonomy. Instead, it critiques Bowers's invocation of history as an
obstacle to recognizing that right, which principled elaboration of the precedents
protecting privacy or autonomy (mentioned above) would lead one to recognize.
That is, the Court clears away White's and Burger's use of history in Bowers as
representing "millennia of moral teaching" precluding recognizing the right. So,
Kennedy analyzes history to debunk their monolithic and traditionalist claims
about history. Thus, the Court uses history negatively to show that history does
not foreclose a just interpretation of our Constitution to protect the right of
homosexuals to privacy or autonomy. I guess you could call that jurisgenerative if
jurisgenerative includes clearing away the brush that stands in the way of
elaborating abstract constitutional principles. This would especially be true if you
see the Court as clearing away the concrete historical practices and
presuppositions that stand in the way of recognizing a right that is essential to
according respect and dignity to, rather than demeaning the existence of,
homosexual persons.
What is the Court's conception of tradition? Let's distinguish three available
conceptions. First, tradition as abstract aspirational principles (e.g., Brennan's
dissenting opinion in Michael H.6°)-principles to which we as a people aspire and
for which we as a people stand, whether or not we have always realized them in

56. Bowers, 478 U.S. at 197 (Burger, C.J., concurring). Burger also specifically characterized that
moral teaching in terms of "Judeao-Christian moral and ethical standards." Id. at 196.
57. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-81.
58. See 478 U.S. at 214-16 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
59. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-79.
60. 491 U.S. at 141 (Brennan, Marshall & Blackmun, JJ., dissenting). For Michelman's analysis of
Brennan's conception of tradition, see Michelman, supra n. 3, at 99-112; Michelman, supra n. 5, at
1312-20.
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our historical practices, statute books, or common law. Second, tradition as
concrete historical practices (e.g., Scalia's plurality opinion in Michael H. 61)liberty includes whatever liberties were protected specifically in the statute books
or recognized concretely in the common law when the Fourteenth Amendment
was adopted in 1868. And third, tradition as a "rational continuum" and a "living
thing" (e.g., Harlan's dissenting opinion in Poe v. Ullman62)-liberty is a "rational
continuum," a "balance struck by this country, having regard to what history
teaches are the traditions from which it developed as well as the traditions from
63
which it broke. That tradition is a living thing.,
Above, I suggested that White's conception of tradition in Bowers was a
precursor to Scalia's Michael H. conception of tradition as concrete historical
practices. In Casey, the Court explicitly set its face against that conception; 64 it
implicitly did so in Lawrence as well. What conception does Lawrence express?
Does it reflect what I have called a Brennan-like notion of tradition as aspirational
principles? Or is it better seen as reflecting a Harlan-like notion of tradition as a
"living thing"? Under the latter view, we have regard for the traditions from
which we have broken-here, the Court looks at the states' evolving repudiation
of statutes outlawing sodomy differently than White did in Bowers6-as well as
the traditions we carry forward. Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence practically
implies that, on a proper understanding of tradition as a living thing, the pattern of
repeal of laws proscribing sodomy between 1961 and 1986 should have supported
the opposite holding in Bowers.66 Others have made this argument before.676 I
suspect that Kennedy would come out more like Harlan than like Brennan, to the
extent that Brennan's conception of tradition is more abstract, aspirational, and
liberal, and Harlan's conception is more conservative (in the sense of what I have
elsewhere called a preservative conservatism as distinguished from a counterrevolutionary conservatism 68): that of a common law constitutionalist
conservatively elaborating our traditions.
How does all this compare with Frank's analysis? Kennedy's opinion, all in
all, is indeed quite jurisgenerative rather than authoritarian, though it should
come as no surprise if the content of Kennedy's jurisprudence were to turn out to
be more conservative than Frank's (and for that matter Brennan's). More later in
connection with Kennedy's attempt to bracket the implications of his opinion for
same-sex marriage.

61. 491 U.S. at 127 n. 6 (plurality).
62. 367 U.S. 497, 542-43 (1961) (Harlan, J., dissenting).
63. Id. at 542.
64. See 505 U.S. at 847-48.
65. See Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2480-81.
66. Id.
67. See e.g. Charles Fried, Order and Law: Arguing the Reagan Revolution-A FirsthandAccount
81-85 (Simon & Schuster 1991); Laurence H. Tribe & Michael C. Dorf, On Reading the Constitution
76-79, 116-17 (Harv. U. Press 1991).
68. See Fleming, supra n. 29, at 60.
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The third manner in which Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence adopts a more
jurisgenerative approach is that it does not conceive democracy in the
authoritarian way that Bowers does. Bowers regarded enacting the majority's
moral disapproval of homosexual intimate conduct as unquestionably and
unproblematically a legitimate governmental interest. 69 Kennedy's opinion in
Romer treated this instead as reflecting unconstitutional animus against a
politically unpopular group (in violation of the Equal Protection Clause).70
Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence makes the same move, though it grounds its
holding in the Due Process Clause rather than equal protection.7
Hence,
Lawrence and Romer entail that in our form of democratic self-government,
establishing a legitimate governmental interest requires conceiving public
regarding reasons that do not reflect animus against politically unpopular groups.
This jives with Frank's liberal republican concerns to bring such groups "from the
margins" to the "center."72
IV.

KENNEDY'S OPINION IN LAWRENCE: LIBERAL, REPUBLICAN,
OR A SYNTHESIS?

To what extent does Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence, like Frank's liberal
republican conception, reflect a synthesis of republicanism and liberalism? Not
surprisingly, Kennedy's opinion lends itself to a number of interpretations, for
instead of reflecting one coherent theory it weaves together elements of several
theories. Let's do "a Sandel" on Kennedy's opinion. That is, let's go through it
and single-mindedly differentiate the liberal strains from the republican strains.
Doing this will oversimplify somewhat but, for our purposes, it may be
illuminating. I have coined this term-"a Sandel"-with the greatest appreciation
and respect for Michael Sandel.73
In doing a Sandel, let's say that the liberal elements bespeak concern for
choice, autonomy, toleration, and bracketing moral arguments and disagreement,
while the republican elements bespeak concern for justifying freedoms on the
basis of substantive moral arguments about the goods or virtues they promote, or
on the basis of their significance for citizenship.74
An aside about the way Frank would see this: Unlike Sandel, he would not
feel obliged to sort out the arguments between liberalism and repub .canism in

69. See 478 U.S. at 196.
70. See 517 U.S. at 633-35.
71. See 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
72. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1529.
73. See e.g. Michael J. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent: America in Search of a PublicPhilosophy 48, 91-119 (Harv. U. Press 1996) [hereinafter Sandel, Democracy's Discontent]; Michael J. Sandel, Moral
Argument and Liberal Toleration: Abortion and Homosexuality, 77 Cal. L. Rev. 521 (1989). For a
critique of Sandel's form of civic republican constitutional theory, see James E. Fleming & Linda C.
McClain, In Search of a Substantive Republic, 76 Tex. L. Rev. 509 (1997).
74. See e.g. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent,supra n. 73, at 103-08.
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75

this manner.
And he would see as republican (or liberal republican) some
arguments that Sandel would see as liberal (e.g., arguments in Blackmun's dissent
in Bowers about homosexual relationships). 76 To some extent, this reflects the
differences between Sandel's yearning for a thicker civic republicanism and
Frank's liberal republicanism.77
To some extent, it reflects different
understandings of the form republican constitutional theory should take in the
face of reasonable moral pluralism. Sandel goes for thicker substantive moral
arguments than would likely be made within a Rawlsian political liberalism that is
congenial to Frank. 7' Frank, by contrast, is quite taken with arguments for
thinning down a Rawlsian conception. 79 That is what I thought about pondering
when I considered writing about Frank's reflections on "constitutional
containment" and the thinness of constitutional law.80
A.

The Liberal Strains of Kennedy's Opinion in Lawrence

1. Mill's Harm Principle: Kennedy evokes or echoes John Stuart Mill's
"harm principle"-"That the only purpose for which power can be rightfully
exercised over any member of a civilized community, against his will, is to prevent
harm to others"81-in the following passage: "This, as a general rule, should
counsel against attempts by the State, or a court, to define the meaning of the
relationship or to set its boundaries absent injury to a person or abuse of an
institution the law protects."8' Or again, Kennedy deems it significant to note that
the present case involves conduct in private by consenting adults: "It does not
involve persons who might be injured or coerced or who are situated in
relationships where consent might not easily be refused. 83 Rather, "[t]he case
does involve two adults who, with full and mutual consent from each other,
engaged in sexual practices common to a homosexual lifestyle."" These passages
may lend some credence to Randy Barnett's interpretation of Kennedy's opinion
as libertarian.85
2. "Sweet-Mystery-of-Life" Liberalism: Kennedy's opinion in Lawrence,
quoting from the joint opinion in Casey, proclaims that decisions about sexual
conduct and relationships involve "the most intimate and personal choices a

75. Compare id: at 99-100 with Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1494-99 (clearly
contemplating that liberalism is not fundamentally at odds with republicanism, but that a synthesis of
liberalism and republicanism provides the best account of our constitutional order).
76. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1535.
77. See Fleming & McClain, supra n. 73, at 548-49.
78. Id.
79. See Frank I. Michelman, Rawls on Constitutionalismand ConstitutionalLaw, in The Cambridge
Companion to John Rawls 394 (Samuel Freeman ed., Cambridge U. Press 2003); Michelman, Ida's
Way, supra n. 2; Michelman, Reflections, supra n. 2; Michelman, Storrs Lectures, supra n. 2.
80. See supra n. 2 and accompanying text.
81. John Stuart Mill, On Liberty 9 (Elizabeth Rapaport ed., Hackett Publg. 1978).
82. Lawrence, 123 S.Ct. at 2478 (emphasis added).
83. Id. at 2484.
84. Id.
85. See Randy E. Barnett, Justice Kennedy's Libertarian Revolution: Lawrence v. Texas, in Cato
Supreme Court Review 2002-2003, at 21 (Cato Inst. 2003).
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person may make in a lifetime, choices central to personal dignity and
autonomy." 86 He continues: "At the heart of liberty is the right to define one's
own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mystery of
human life. Beliefs about these matters could not define the attributes of
personhood were they formed under compulsion of the State. 87 In dissent, Scalia
ridicules Kennedy's invocation of what he calls this "sweet-mystery-of-life
passage '' 8 from Casey. Sandel no less than Scalia would cringe at these passages,
and he would see them as exalting choice itself, without regard to the good of what
is chosen.89 Sandel also argues that these passages reflect a liberal conception of
the unencumbered, freely choosing voluntarist self. 90
3. Liberal Privacy or Autonomy: Kennedy's opinion emphasizes privacy as
autonomy to make certain decisions fundamentally affecting one's destiny and the
like.9" This is the more rationalist as opposed to voluntarist or existentialist
interpretation of passages like those derided by Scalia. Sandel commends
Griswold, which he views as resting upon the "old privacy": (1) the privacy of the
home and (2) the goods or virtues of protecting the institution of marriage or the
marital relationship.92 He, like Mary Ann Glendon, contends that Eisenstadt took
a fateful wrong turn to the "new privacy": namely, individual autonomy to make
certain decisions.93 Sandel at first glance might see Lawrence as being similar to
Eisenstadt in this respect. Yet Lawrence, like Griswold, emphasizes (1) the
privacy of the home in the sense that it observes that it is protecting private
conduct rather than conduct in public and (2) (arguably) the goods of protecting
and respecting homosexual intimate association and relationships by analogy to
94
heterosexual intimate association and relationships.
4. Liberal Toleration: Sandel, in his critique of liberal toleration arguments
against Bowers, contended that such arguments actually demeaned homosexuals
by bracketing the morality of homosexual intimate association.95 He contended
that these arguments take the form: what people do in private, even if we consider
it an abomination, is no business of ours. We must live and let live, and we must
tolerate people doing what we regard as abominable or demeaning behavior so
long as they do it in private. Sandel also argues that such arguments win at best a
"thin" and "fragile" or empty toleration; they fall far short of attaining the
96
appreciation or respect that would be necessary to secure important freedoms.

86. 123 S. Ct. at 2481 (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
87. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 851).
88. Id. at 2489 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
89. Sandel cringed at these passages when the joint opinion in Casey initially uttered them. See
Sandel, Democracy's Discontent, supra n. 73, at 99.
90. Id.
91. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2477-78.
92. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent,supra n. 73, at 94-98.
93. Id. at 97-99. For Glendon's similar analysis, see Mary Ann Glendon, Rights Talk: The
Impoverishment of PoliticalDiscourse57 (Free Press 1991).
94. See 123 S. Ct. at 2482, 2484.
95. Sandel, Democracy's Discontent,supra n. 73, at 106-07.
96. Id. at 107.
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Kennedy does not make this form of "empty" liberal toleration argument.
To be sure, Kennedy notes the longstanding religious and moral disapproval of
homosexual intimate conduct and relationships. 97 And he quotes the passage from
Casey: "Our obligation is to define the liberty of all, not to mandate our own
moral code." 98 Sandel might think that in these passages Kennedy embraces or at
least flirts with the foregoing type of liberal toleration argument. But Kennedy
pointedly argues in several places that it "demeans" the lives or existences of
homosexual persons not to accord them a right to privacy or autonomy analogous
to that accorded heterosexual persons. 99 He emphasizes that homosexuals are
entitled to respect. So, if Kennedy makes or presupposes a liberal toleration
argument, it is not an "empty toleration" argument, but a "toleration as respect"
argument (to invoke a distinction drawn by Linda McClain).1°°
B.

The Republican Strains of Kennedy's Opinion in Lawrence

Is Lawrence republican (or liberal republican) in ways that accord with
Frank's analysis? Strikingly, Kennedy's opinion, like Frank's analysis, does not
eschew privacy for equality: it squarely grounds its holding in the Due Process
Clause rather than the Equal Protection Clause.01 The equal protection route
certainly was available to Kennedy, given Romer's grounding in equality 2 (and,
of course, O'Connor urges this route in concurrence in Lawrence0 3). Sandel
might see this privacy holding as evidence of liberalism, but Frank might view it in
a republican light. Frank, after all, highlights the political significance of
privacy.' °4 From the standpoint of Frank's analysis, we can see that Kennedy's
privacy holding evinces an understanding that free and equal citizenship is a status
due to all. Let me work up to this claim through a discussion of five points: (1)
"demeans"; (2) analogies; (3) the "homosexual agenda"; (4) the "invention of
heterosexuality"; and (5) the goods and virtues of relationships, not just individual
choices.
1. Demeans: What are we to make of Kennedy's arguments that it "demeans
the lives"'0 5 of homosexuals to respect the right of heterosexuals to autonomy
without respecting an analogous right for them?' °6 Should we view these
arguments as liberal or republican? On one reading, these passages simply reflect
a liberal principle of appreciation, respect, and dignity, as distinguished from a
liberal principle of "empty" toleration. But on the best reading, I believe

97. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2480.
98. Id. (quoting Casey, 505 U.S. at 850).
99. Id. at 2478, 2482, 2484.
100. See Linda C. McClain, Toleration, Autonomy, and Governmental Promotion of Good Lives:
Beyond "Empty" Toleration to Toleration as Respect, 59 Ohio St. L.J. 19 (1998).
101. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
102. See Romer, 517 U.S. at 634-36.
103. 123 S. Ct. at 2484-85 (O'Connor, J., concurring in the judgment).
104. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1532-37.
105. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
106. See id. at 2478, 2482, 2484.

2004]

LAWRENCE'S REPUBLIC

"demeans" also connotes a recognition of a status of free and equal citizenship
due to all. The Court packs such a notion into its due process analysis, through its
recognition that homosexual intimate association is analogous to heterosexual
intimate association (rather than, say, to the "traditional 'morals' offenses"' 0 7 on
Scalia's parade of horribles). This brings us to the next point.
2. Analogies: Kennedy's opinion recognizes that homosexual intimate
association is analogous to heterosexual intimate association rather than, as Scalia
would have it, to bestiality and the like. 1°8 Kennedy's opinion is certainly the
opposite of White's opinion in Bowers in this regard: White said that none of the
rights recognized in precedents from Meyer v. Nebraska'0 9 through Griswold,
Eisenstadt, and Roe "bears any resemblance" to the right asserted in Bowers."0 In
dissent, Scalia castigates Kennedy's opinion for putting the Court on a slippery
slope leading to "the end of all morals legislation.'
If, said Scalia, states may not
enact their moral disapproval of homosexual sodomy, they may not in principle
enact their disapproval of "bigamy, same-sex marriage, adult incest, prostitution,
masturbation, adultery, fornication, bestiality, and obscenity.""' 2
For him,
homosexuals' intimate sexual conduct is analogous to such traditional morals
offenses, not to heterosexuals' autonomy regarding intimate associations. Not so
Kennedy: again, his recognition of the analogy itself suggests recognition that
homosexuals, like heterosexuals, are due the status of free and equal citizenship.
3. "Homosexual Agenda": Scalia complains that Kennedy's opinion "has
largely signed on to the so-called homosexual agenda."'" 3 Scalia writes: "One of
the most revealing statements in today's opinion is the Court's grim warning that
the criminalization of homosexual conduct is 'an invitation to subject homosexual
persons to discrimination both in the public and in the private spheres.""' 4 He
continues: "It is clear from this that the Court has taken sides in the culture war,
departing from its role of assuring, as neutral observer, that the democratic rules
of engagement are observed.""..5 I can envision this passage launching a thousand
liberal and progressive fundraising ships. Just imagine fundraising solicitations
from gay and lesbian rights organizations quoting Scalia's formulation and
retorting "We have an agenda": to establish that homosexuals are people, too, and
to secure the status of free and equal citizenship for gays and lesbians. Kennedy's
opinion in Lawrence, like his opinion in Romer rejecting the idea that gays and

107. Id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
108. Compare id. at 2482 (majority) with id. at 2490 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J.,
dissenting).
109. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
110. 478 U.S. at 190-91.
111. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
112. Id. at 2490.
113. Id. at 2496.
114. Id. at 2496-97 (quoting id. at 2482 (majority)).
115. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2497 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
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lesbians were seeking "special rights,"'1 6 recognizes the significance of such a
status in protecting gays and lesbians against discrimination.
4. "Invention of Heterosexuality":I never thought I would see the day when
I could go on Westlaw, enter the Supreme Court cases file, and search for and
actually find the phrase "invention of heterosexuality," and by implication the
idea of the invention of homosexuality, much less find the Court practically
embracing the idea. Well, that day has come. Kennedy writes: "The absence of
legal prohibitions focusing on homosexual conduct may be explained in part by
noting that according to some scholars the concept of the homosexual as a distinct
category of person did not emerge until the late 19th century,1 1 7 citing a book
entitled The Invention of Heterosexuality.1 8 Here, Kennedy's opinion shows that
it is implicitly jurisgenerative rather than authoritarian: it recognizes that
homosexuality is not simply an historical given and a moral fact of the matter but
is socially and legally constructed. Recognizing this helps clear the path to an
argument for securing the status of free and equal citizenship for homosexuals
along with heterosexuals (rather than treating them as outcasts or second-class
persons by nature).
5. The Goods and Virtues of Relationships, Not Just Individual Choices:
Does Kennedy's opinion make (or at least point toward) substantive moral
arguments about the goods or virtues fostered through protecting homosexual
intimate conduct and relationships that even a civic republican like Sandel could
acknowledge or praise? There is no doubt that Kennedy does not make such
arguments as fully, thickly, and explicitly as Sandel would. And Sandel might say
that just goes to show the limits of privacy arguments and indeed indicates why the
opinion stops short of implicitly embracing same-sex marriage. Still, there are
notions of goods or virtues implicit in Kennedy's acceptance of the analogy
between homosexual intimate association and heterosexual intimate association." 9
Moreover, Kennedy sees not merely analogies of choice but also analogies
regarding relationships.120 He sees that Lawrence is not simply about the right to
homosexual sodomy any more than Griswold was simply about the right to
heterosexual intercourse. 2' More generally, as stated above, Kennedy's opinion
signals a return from the "new privacy" of Eisenstadt to the "old privacy" of
Griswold in two respects: (1) concern for privacy of the home (in the sense of
protecting private conduct rather than conduct in public) and (2) concern for
protecting not only choices but also relationships. Finally, as argued above, there
is implicit in Kennedy's passages about how Bowers "demeans the lives" of
homosexual persons a concern for securing their status as free and equal citizens:
these passages are not simply about permitting choice and autonomy.

116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.

See Romer, 517 U.S. at 631.
Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2478-79.
Id.; see Jonathan Ned Katz, The Invention of Heterosexuality 10 (Dutton 1995).
See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2482.
See id. at 2478.
Id.

2004]

LAWRENCE'S REPUBLIC
V.

Is THERE ANYTHING SIGNIFICANT MISSING FROM

KENNEDY'S OPINION IN LAWRENCE THAT MICHELMAN'S
ANALYSIS OF BOWERS WOULD PROVIDE?

Still, is there anything significant missing from Kennedy's opinion in
Lawrence that Frank's analysis of Bowers would give us? Nothing? If so, have I
pulled off a feat with Kennedy's opinion comparable to what Frank is sometimes
(mistakenly) thought to have done, for example, with Rehnquist's opinion of the
Court in National League of Cities v. Usery122 (evidently deriving welfare rights
from Rehnquist's analysis of the traditional roles and functions of state
governments)?12 ' That is, have I engaged in such a generous elaboration of what
Frank (following Roberto Unger) calls "deviationist doctrine' ' 124 and "internal
development"'5 that there is little more to be said outside Kennedy's opinion?
Maybe so.
Is Kennedy's opinion less robustly jurisgenerative than Frank's analysis
would be? Probably so. Is Kennedy's opinion thinner in its republicanism (or
liberal republicanism) than the analysis that Frank would give us? Again,
probably so. Put another way, does Lawrence give us as full an explication of the
political significance of privacy as an aspect of free and equal citizenship as Frank
would? Surely not. For example, Frank's analysis presumably would lead all the
way to endorsing same-sex marriage. Speaking of which, what are we to make of
Kennedy's disclaimer regarding same-sex marriage? 26 Does it show that his
opinion is ultimately more liberal than republican, as Sandel might suspect? Does
it show that the opinion is insufficiently republican in the sense that its
implications concerning the goods or virtues of homosexual intimate associationand the analogies between homosexual intimate association and heterosexual
intimate association-are too liberal and too thin? When all is said and done, do
they reach only to protecting the intimate sexual conduct and the relationships
that individual homosexuals themselves choose, not all the way to securing legal
recognition of their relationships through the institution of marriage?
Most charitably, the Court was careful to make clear that it was not deciding
the question of same-sex marriage because it was not before the Court. For
example, the Court may have thought that it was enough to drop one bomb at a
time: prudence requires such a disclaimer. Perhaps the Court, reading the
evolving consensus of this nation-and that of a wider, Western civilization-

122. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
123. See Frank I. Michelman, States' Rights and States' Roles: Permutations of "Sovereignty" in
National League of Cities v. Usery, 86 Yale L.J. 1165 (1977).
124. See Michelman, Law's Republic, supra n. 4, at 1529 (drawing a parallel between his own
approach to interpreting cases and Unger's conceptions of "deviationist doctrine" and "internal
development" and citing Roberto Mangabeira Unger, The Critical Legal Studies Movement 15-19
(Harv. U. Press 1986)).
125. See id.
126. See Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2488.
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thought that this is as far as we have come right now."' This would be like Bill
Clinton, the most pro-gay and lesbian rights president in American history,
advocating toleration and even respect for gays, while at the same time signing the
Defense of Marriage Act 1 8 (defining marriage as a union of one man and one
woman). Presumably, Clinton did so because he thought that it was where public
opinion was at the time. And presumably, Clinton thought that it would be
harmful to the Democratic Party not to sign the bill, given the backlash that he
feared would ensue if he vetoed it. In the terms that Scalia disparagingly used in
dissent in Lawrence and Romer, the view might be that proponents of the
"homosexual agenda"' 2 9 have not entirely succeeded in their project of moving
from "grudging social toleration"' 3 to "full social acceptance" 3 ' of homosexuality.
But indeed the principles underlying Lawrence, elaborated through a
jurisgenerative approach to constitutional interpretation, should lead ultimately to
recognizing same-sex marriage. That is not to say, however, that Scalia is right in
warning that those principles have put the Court on a slippery slope leading to
'
For there are moral distinctions between
"the end of all morals legislation."132
homosexual intimate association, on the one hand, and the "traditional 'morals'
offenses" on Scalia's slippery slope.
VI.

CONCLUSION: THE JURISGENERATIVE
QUEST FOR HAPPY ENDINGS

In concluding, I want to discuss Frank's pursuit of what Sandy Levinson has
called "happy endings" in constitutional interpretation. 133 This is his version of
Henry Monaghan's "perfect Constitution" critique of certain normative
constitutional theories.' 34 They and others have expressed skepticism about
constitutional theories like Dworkin's and Frank's (and my own) on the ground
that they always seem to lead to happy endings: that the Constitution, properly
interpreted, requires the result that our political theories recommend. Basically,
the implication is that a constitutional theory has no serious claim on our attention
unless the theorist putting it forward suffers some pain by acknowledging that the
Constitution does not secure everything that she or he would protect in a perfect
Constitution. 35

127. But see Goodridge v. Dept. of Public Health, 798 N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003) (holding that limiting
the benefits of marriage to heterosexual couples violated the Massachusetts Constitution); Linda
Greenhouse, Supreme Court Paved Way for Marriage Ruling with Sodomy Law Decision, 153 N.Y.
Times A24 (Nov. 19, 2003).
128. Pub. L. No. 104-199, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996).
129. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2496 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
130. Romer, 517 U.S. at 646 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
131. Id.
132. Lawrence, 123 S. Ct. at 2495 (Scalia, J., Rehnquist, C.J. & Thomas, J., dissenting).
133. See Colloquy, Fidelity as Integrity, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1357, 1358 (1997).
134. See Henry P. Monaghan, Our Perfect Constitution, 56 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 353 (1981).
135. For the formulation of Monaghan's "perfect Constitution" critique as a "no pain, no claim" test,
see Christopher L. Eisgruber, Justice and the Text: Rethinking the Constitutional Relation between
Principleand Prudence,43 Duke L.J. 1, 7 (1993).
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Remarkably, when Sandy put the "happy endings" or "perfect Constitution"
challenge to Dworkin when reviewing the manuscript of Dworkin's book,
Freedom's Law, 136 Dworkin basically pleaded: Not guilty, you must think I am
Frank Michelman.
Dworkin's reply in essence was: I don't believe our
Constitution is perfect. For example, while I do believe that justice requires
welfare rights, I do not believe that our Constitution protects such rights. He
continued in essence: Your challenge applies to Frank Michelman-not mebecause he-not I-believes that our Constitution does protect welfare rights.'37 I
can understand that Frank might be puzzled or even irked that Dworkin pointed
the finger at him in this way. But I would urge him instead to wear this as a badge
of honor. For there is no shame in having even more normative kick to your
constitutional theory than Dworkin has in his.
In 1996, we held a conference at Fordham on the idea of fidelity in
constitutional interpretation. 38 There came a moment of great dismay for me.
Larry Lessig was waxing eloquent about his notions of fidelity as translation and
of constitutional change. Dramatically, he suggested that Frank's arguments for
constitutional welfare rights, even if plausible in 1969, are off the wall now.'39 At
our next Fordham conference on constitutional theory, "The Constitution and the
Good Society," Willy Forbath opened a dialogue with Frank on welfare rights by
criticizing Lessig's remarks.140 I am on Forbath's side.
I want to use this incident to bring my paper to a hokey conclusion. I am
going to take a page out of the movie It's a Wonderful Life and muse about the
wonderful life and scholarship of Frank Michelman. One of the wonderful things
about Frank is that he courageously, creatively, and tirelessly argues for justice,
happy endings, and other good things. But imagine that at a crucial point in his
life as a constitutional theorist-say, the day the Supreme Court handed down
Dandridge v. Williams,
or San Antonio Independent School District v.
Rodriguez,'42 or National League of Cities v. Usery, 43 or DeShaney v. Winnebago
County Department of Social Services'44-he had come upon Larry Lessig. What
if Larry had persuaded him that his arguments for welfare rights were no longer

136. See Ronald Dworkin, Freedom's Law: The Moral Reading of the American Constitution 36
(Harv. U. Press 1996). In colloquy with Dworkin at the Fordham conference on Fidelity in
Constitutional Theory, Levinson revealed himself to be the reviewer who had raised this question or
challenge of Dworkin's manuscript. Colloquy, supra n. 133, at 1358.
137. See Dworkin, supra n. 136, at 36 (citing Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra n. 1).
13& See Symposium, Fidelity in ConstitutionalTheory, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1247 (1997).
139. See Colloquy, Fidelity as Translation, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1507, 1509-10 (1997) ("Here is Frank
Michelman ... [,]" pointing to Frank. "In 1969, he writes a piece [Michelman, Protecting the Poor,
supra n. 1] that simply doesn't live in this world anymore."); J.M. Balkin, Agreements with Hell and
Other Objects of Our Faith, 65 Fordham L. Rev. 1703, 1732-33 (1997) (noting that the idea of welfare
rights may now seem "off the wall").
140. William E. Forbath, Constitutional Welfare Rights: A History, Critique and Reconstruction, 69
Fordham L. Rev. 1821, 1824-26 (2001).
141. 397 U.S. 471 (1970).
142. 411 U.S. 1 (1973).
143. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
144. 489 U.S. 189 (1989).
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professionally respectable but were off the wall? And what if Frank had become
demoralized and had not continued making the arguments for which we honor and
love him? Indeed, what if Frank had said, "I must give up the quest for justice and
instead conform myself to our increasingly imperfect world"?
Frank might have written rather different articles, with rather different titles.
Instead of writing "Foreword: On Protecting the Poor through the Fourteenth
Amendment, 145 Frank might have written "Foreword: On Protecting the Rich
Instead of "Welfare Rights in a
through the Fourteenth Amendment."
Constitutional Democracy,"' 46 he might have written "The Impossibility of
Finding Welfare Rights in a Plutocracy. 1 47 Instead of "Foreword: Traces of SelfGovernment,", 48 he might have written "Afterword: The Lost Traces of SelfGovernment." And finally, to come full circle, instead of "Law's Republic,"
Frank might have written "Law's Authoritarianism."
And we wouldn't be celebrating the wonderful life and scholarship of Frank
Michelman!

145. Michelman, Protecting the Poor, supra n. 1.
146. Michelman, Welfare Rights, supra n. 1.
147. I deliberately echo the title of Bork's critique of Michelman. See Robert H. Bork, The
Impossibility of Finding Welfare Rights in the Constitution, 1979 Wash. U. L.Q. 695.
148. Michelman, Traces, supra n. 4.

